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Abstract 
 
In 2003, the youth justice system in Scotland entered a new phase with the 
introduction of a pilot youth court. The processing of persistent 16 and 17 year 
old (and serious 15 year olds)  represented  a  stark  deviation  from  a  ‘child  
centred’  and  needs-oriented  state apparatus for dealing with young offenders to 
one based on deeds and individual responsibility. This article, based on an 
evaluation funded by the Scottish Executive, is the first to provide a critical 
appraisal of this youth justice reform. It examines the views of the judiciary and 
young offenders and reveals that the pilot youth court in Scotland represents a 
punitive excursion that poses serious concerns for due process, human rights and 
net widening. 
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Introduction 
 
. . . the way a society treats its children reflects not only its qualities of compassion 
and protective caring, but also its sense of justice, its commitment to the future 
and its urge to enhance the human condition for coming generations. 
(Former UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, quoted in Murray and 
Hallett, 2000: 23) 
 
The Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 established specialized ‘Juvenile 
Courts’ to deal with child offenders aged 8–21. The courts were abolished as a result of 
the Kilbrandon recommendations that were integrated into the Social Work (Scotland) Act 
1968. The Kilbrandon Committee referred to the shortcomings of the Juvenile Court as 
inherent in a system that is required ‘to combine the characteristics of a court of 
criminal law with those of a specialised agency for the treatment of children in need, 
whether juvenile offenders or children in need of care and protection’ (Kilbrandon Report, 
1964: 182). The Kilbrandon Report proposed a multifaceted and welfare-oriented forum, 
namely the Children’s Hearing System, to deal with the needs 
  
of children. Since its introduction in 1971, the Scottish Children’s Hearing System has been 
widely acclaimed as ‘Scotland’s most original and distinctive contribution to child welfare’  
in  the  twentieth  century  (Murray  and  Hill,  1991:  297).   
Its  philosophy  of ‘childcentreness’ with a unified approach to juvenile justice and child 
welfare has repeatedly  been  identified  as  the  most  effective  way  to  deal  with  the  
social  and economic contexts of disadvantaged young people (Asquith and Docherty, 1999; 
cf. Bottoms, 2002). To date, evaluation studies of the Children’s Hearings System have 
emphasized procedural changes, notably the need to increase rights and advocacy for 
children, while at the same time proclaiming its effectiveness and appropriateness for 
dealing with young offending (Hallett and Murray, 1998; Murray and Hallett, 2000). 
That said, and for political rather than empirical reasons, the Scottish Executive has decided 
to pursue alternative and more punitive measures for teenage offenders while at the 
same time declaring that ‘youth crime has been on a downward trend for the last 
10 years’ (Scottish Executive, 2005a). 
This move towards penal populism has been partly fuelled by growing media-led 
campaigns (see The Daily Record, 2003; The Evening Times, 2004 and The Sunday 
Herald, 2004 and New Labour’s assault on anti-social behaviour within its self-styled 
political platform of ‘respect’. 
The Scottish Executive’s response to media and  public disquiet and to  broader 
political developments have its origins in the 27 June 2002 launch of a 10-point action 
plan designed to address the problems of young offending. In the foreword to this 
document the then Minister for Education and Young People (Cathy Jamison, MSP) 
argued that the Scottish Children’s Hearing System for dealing with young offenders, 
was ‘successful in the majority of cases’ but new initiatives would be sought to ‘test 
whether 16 and 17 year old offenders could be dealt with more effectively through the 
Children’s Hearing System’ (Scottish Executive, 2002: 21). This initiative was proposed 
within the unqualified notion of ‘easing the transition between the youth justice and 
adult justice system’, and for increasing public confidence in Scotland’s system of youth 
justice. In reality, the Scottish Executive by-passed the intended procedure of sending 
16 and 17 year olds through the Children’s Hearing System, and in its place, introduced 
a pilot youth court. As McAra (2006) has noted, ‘. . . Ministers opted for a court-based 
setting instead, serves to reinforce the more robust, punitive approach which has now 
been adopted towards persistent offenders’. 
Recent Scottish Executive documentation has repeatedly identified that the 10-point 
action plan recommended the ‘feasibility of establishing a Youth Court’ (see Scottish 
Executive, 2004). Yet, the 10-point action plan makes no mention of a youth court. 
Nevertheless, a pilot youth court was established in June 2003 to deal with persistent 
16 and 17 year old offenders and serious 15 year old offenders who were resident in 
parts  of  North  and  South  Lanarkshire.  Persistent  young  offenders  (defined  by  a 
minimum of three criminal charges in six months) would be fast tracked to an adult 
Sheriff Court (sitting as a Youth Court) within 10 days of being charged.1  Following 
this, in 2003 a team of researchers at the University of Stirling, the University of 
Strathclyde and TNS Social were commissioned by the Scottish Executive to undertake an 
evaluation of the pilot youth court.2  The aims of the evaluation were to assess the 
advantages and disadvantages of the youth court model; to determine the effectiveness 
  
of the youth court in relation to process, delivery, outcome and costs; to assess whether 
the youth court was effective and whether it met its objectives and to explore the 
long-term viability of the youth court across Scotland. Within 12 months, the Scottish 
Executive was declaring the success of the pilot (prior to the submission or publication of 
the evaluation) and as a result, decided to extend the pilot with the opening of a 
second youth court in Airdrie (see BBC News, 2004). 
The above-mentioned evaluation of the youth court (see McIvor et al., 2004; Popham et 
al., 2005a&b) identified ‘procedural success’, notably the ‘fast tracking of young people 
into the court system; meeting timescales; the ‘smooth operation’ of the court (although 
dedicated resources that aim to address specific offender needs have not been forthcoming 
and has raised substantial judicial concern). 
While  greater  use  of  detention  and  community  sentences  than  in  the  Sheriff 
Summary Court was identified, the effects upon young offending could not be determined. 
Also identified were key gaps in bail accommodation and mental health services for young 
people and the links between mental health and social work services were found to be 
inadequate. The evaluation also found that local political opposition hampered the 
development of bail accommodation in South Lanarkshire (Popham et. al., 2005a&b). That 
said, a media release from the office of the Scottish Justice Minister, Cathy Jamieson 
announced an extension of the youth court based on its ‘success’ stating that, 
 
. . . reducing youth crime is one of our biggest priorities and the Hamilton youth 
court pilot has contributed to meeting this challenge in an innovative and effective 
way . . . This is an excellent example of how, by working together, we can rid 
Scotland of the blight of persistent offending. 
(Jamieson, 2005: 1) 
 
The contradictory philosophical trajectories underpinning these new developments with an 
emphasis on responsibilization, fast track and regulation, are consistent with other New 
Labour initiatives in England and Wales (see Muncie and Goldson, 2006). 
This article examines the emergence of the youth, or what has been referred to as 
the ‘Burberry’, court in  Scotland.3   The article focuses  attention on two  significant 
groups in this new model of justice – the judiciary and young offenders. We draw from 
work that was conducted for the evaluation, but specifically, we focus on in-depth 
semi-structured interviews that were conducted with the full cohort of 12 Sheriffs who 
presided over youth court business and six young offenders who appeared before the 
youth court. 
Young people were approached through their social workers with consent to be 
interviewed. In addition, a total of 40 hours of court observations were undertaken at both 
pilot courts. The observations covered the full range of court business from the first callings 
of cases through to intermediate diets and trials to sentence and then to reviews and 
breaches. The observations achieved a range of objectives including an identification of 
the temporal and spatial distances between all those involved in the youth court; the 
verbal and non-verbal exchanges between those involved; the young person’s response to 
court room dynamics and the discourse of legal representatives and judicial officers 
notably involving concepts of ‘needs’ and ‘deeds’. 
  
The Pilot Youth Court in Scotland 
 
Scotland currently has two pilot youth courts. The first at the Hamilton Sheriff Court was 
opened in June 2003 and a second at the Airdrie Sheriff Court in July 2004. Alleged 
offenders aged 16 and 17 years (and appropriate 15 year olds) residing in North and 
South Lanarkshire are targeted for the youth court. The identification of these areas 
was based on a perceived increasing number of ‘persistent’ young offenders and the 
alleged effectiveness of local social work networks to deal with these young offenders. 
However, what was not acknowledged is that North and South Lanarkshire represent some 
of the poorest areas of social exclusion in Scotland where deprivation has generated 
serious problems in housing, employment and education (North Lanarkshire and South 
Lanarkshire Council, 2005). Information from the Hamilton pilot evaluation shows that up 
to the end of December 2004, there were 611 referrals featuring 402 people (Popham et. 
al., 2005a). There was a mean of 32 referrals a month between June 2003 to December 
2004, peaking in August 2004 when 71 referrals were made (Popham et al., 2005a). At the 
time of writing, data on referrals at Airdrie Youth Court had not been published. 
 
Objectives and distinctive features 
The objectives of the Sheriff youth court are: 
 
• To reduce the frequency and seriousness of re-offending by 16 and 17 year old 
offenders, particularly persistent offenders (and some 15 year olds are referred to the 
court); 
• To promote the social inclusion, citizenship and personal responsibility of these 
young offenders whilst maximizing their potential; 
• To establish fast track procedures for those young persons appearing before the 
youth court; 
• To enhance community safety, by reducing the harm caused to individual victims of 
crime and providing respite to those communities which experience high levels of 
crime; and 
• To test the viability and usefulness of a youth court using existing legislation and to 
demonstrate whether legislative and practical improvements might be appropriate 
(Youth Court Feasibility Project Group, 2002). 
 
The youth court possesses the same powers of sentencing as the adult summary court 
pursuant to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 and, therefore, adjudicates with all 
the legal equivalence of an adult jurisdiction. The Sheriffs were asked to reflect upon the 
appropriateness of the above objectives for a youth court. While most Sheriffs argued that 
it was not their place to comment on the objectives of the youth court there was a 
view that the origins of the court were political in nature, driven by demands and 
initiatives from the Scottish Executive. As Sheriff A noted, ‘. . . it was initially a politically 
motivated project to try to tackle what was a general public perception of growing youth 
crime’. The above objectives identify a specific target group for intervention. There 
were mixed views about the appropriateness of the target group and concerns regarding 
some cases brought before the court. Overall, there was 
  
a general consensus that the criterion used for youth court cases was questionable, as 
Sheriff B argued, ‘There are some that I ask why on earth have they been brought because 
it’s just one offence and when we get the report there doesn’t seem to be anything to 
suggest that they’re a problem or a persistent offender’. 
There were serious concerns raised about the legality of referral and offender rights. For  
example,  if  the  accused  is  referred  to  the  court  on  the  basis  that  he/she is a 
‘persistent young offender’, then the judiciary has prior knowledge, before the case 
commences, that the accused has a criminal record. As Sheriff C stated, ‘. . . in criminal 
business we’re not supposed to know about previous convictions and it absolutely 
astonishes me that no solicitor has taken a human rights point. Because on the face of it, 
no-one appearing before us is a first offender and we know something about their 
background’. 
This is precisely why the Sheriffs at Airdrie resisted the criteria of ‘persistency’ claiming 
that it breached the European Convention of Human Rights and was a violation of due 
process. As a result, the existing referral criteria (at Hamilton Youth Court) pose significant 
legal and human rights dilemmas. Fundamental issues of due process and rights of the 
accused are compromised for reasons of criminal justice expediency and efficiency. 
Coupled with the above objectives were two ‘distinctive features’ that would set the youth 
court apart from other forms of summary (adult) justice, including ‘improvements to 
existing processes and time scales’ and ‘differences in culture, practice and procedures’. 
The purpose of the ‘distinctive feature’ were articulated by the Scottish Executive to 
provide ‘dedicated youth court Sheriffs’ with an opportunity to be more involved in the 
oversight of their sentencing including review hearings, more detailed social work reports 
and a range of flexible programmes to meet the needs of the young offender (Hamilton 
Sheriff Youth Court, 2003). In addition, dedicated youth court staff, fast tracking of cases, 
an overseeing committee, an external evaluation and the ability to electronically tag 
offenders while of bail, were ‘distinguishing features’. 
Other than the fast-tracking of offenders brought about through dedicated resources, 
the  Sheriffs  do  not  see  anything  distinctive  about  the  youth  court.  There  is  no 
difference in culture, process or procedure. Moreover, judicial members claim that they 
do not have the statutory authority to do anything ‘different’ as they continue to operate 
under the provisions of the Criminal Procedures Act (1995). As Sheriff D commented, 
‘I’ve  just  done  it  without  any  special  training.  I’ve  just  done  it  . . .  in  what  way 
distinctive? There are youths in it’ . . . Interestingly, some members of the judiciary were 
of the opinion that there was no youth court but a youth court process. Indeed, Sheriff E 
argued that ‘. . . we don’t have a youth court; we have a process for dealing with 
younger offenders’. Moreover, the Sheriffs made it clear that the youth court was not 
a soft option or a chance to build rapport with the offender. In other words it was not 
a ‘kiddie court’ as Sheriff F stated: 
 
This is a court, it’s not a nice cosy wee chat and it’s never in my view intended to 
be that. At least it’s never intended to be that by the Sheriffs. I think a degree of 
formality helps without wanting to overstate it too much. The offenders who appear 
before me, I’m the authority figure that they have to deal with. 
  
That said, the rolling up of offences and the speed in which offenders were processed was 
viewed as ‘distinctive’ and a model for all summary justice, and provided a more 
meaningful and efficient sentencing process. In addition, the fast tracking stands out in the 
minds of the Sheriffs as bringing about a larger than expected number of guilty pleas. 
More than 76 per cent of all cases brought to the youth court have included a guilty plea 
and as a result very few matters have proceeded to trial (Popham et al., 
2005a&b). This raises several questions about the context of youth justice in an adult 
setting. 
 
Adult or youth justice? 
In the recent judicial review of The Queen on the Application of ‘C’ v. Leeds Youth 
Court [2005] Lord Justice Laws identified the statutory policy of having young offenders 
processed in a youth jurisdiction and emphasized the ‘duty of the courts to promote 
that policy’. The setting or jurisdiction for hearing charges against a young offender is 
important for affording and recognizing the rights of a child within international law. By 
administering justice in an adult setting, the youth court is subject to adult-oriented 
discourses, adapted  for  young  people,  rendering  young  people  vulnerable  to  adult 
power. To apply a ‘justice’ approach whatever the ‘welfare’ interventions might be, denies 
the essence and status of young people that is embodied in international conventions. The 
complexity of the transition from youth to adulthood is therefore denied, creating a new 
dimension of moral equivalence between the stage of youth and the stage of adulthood. 
The indistinct boundary between the adult and the youth court tests the conventional 
wisdom of the Beijing Rules which impose the view that criminal justice should be applied 
impartially (Article 2.1) to juveniles who should be dealt with in  a  different  manner  
from  adults  (Article  3.1).   
The  Rules  identify  the  dangers  of ‘contaminating young people’ with adult justice: ‘a 
juvenile is a child or young person who, under the respective legal systems, may be dealt 
with for an offence in a manner which is different from an adult’ (Article 2.2a). That is, 
where a system is neither structured nor equipped to deal with young people, this can lead 
to young people becoming anchored to a system that expects young people to live up to 
the equivalent moral and psychological responsibilities normally expected of adults (see 
commentary of Article 4). 
This anchoring to adult justice is demonstrated in sentencing practice. Sheriffs identified 
no difference between youth court sentencing and sentencing conducted within other 
adult summary court business. More concerning was that Sheriffs felt 
‘misled’ over the special programmes that would be available to them as sentencers and 
that no resources had been released for special programmes as part of structured deferred 
sentences or other dispositions. They expressed frustration at the Executive’s failure to 
commit to this key aspect of the youth court. This was one of the main reasons why 
Sheriff C stated, ‘. . . that there isn’t a youth court’ . . . all the programmes and things 
promised that would make it different have not been delivered’. 
 
Net widening 
Two aspects are of major concern. First is the Youth Court’s remit and organization to 
take on a greater responsibility to provide welfare-oriented governance of youth 
  
which is built-in to the sentencing powers of the Sheriff. As mentioned above, Sheriffs feel 
misled on this issue and the lack of dedicated programmes and resources not only indicates 
a failure to meet stated objectives but represents a further breach of international 
protocols. In addition, caution was raised against any undue widening of the net of formal 
social control (Popham et al., 2005a&b). The Beijing Rules stipulate that where a criminal 
court model is utilized to allocate and administer a sentence against  a  juvenile,  the  
well-being  of  the  juvenile  should  be  emphasized  ‘thus contributing to the avoidance 
of merely punitive sanctions’ (Article 5 and 14). More research is clearly necessary to 
determine whether youth justice has expanded in Scotland into a mechanism of adult 
state intervention, through which flows various extra means of social control discourse 
(intense social work intervention, for example). The pilot youth court may represent the 
beginnings of this transition. 
Moreover, we are concerned of the use of ‘contextual background criteria’ for referral to 
the youth court, which is used as an indication of risk. There is flexibility for cases to be 
referred to the youth court by the police or Procurator Fiscal where the young person’s 
circumstances suggest that referral would be appropriate in terms of enhancing community 
safety and reducing the risk of re-offending. This was loosely described by the Youth Court 
Feasibility Group (2002: 11) as ‘contextual criterion’, where the offender ‘poses a risk to 
self or to the public’ .  
Without definition or explanation the ‘contextual criterion’ emerges as a ‘catch-all’ 
category for referring young offenders who fail to meet notions of ‘persistent offender’. 
The evaluation findings raised concerns over the issue of contextual criteria stating, ‘there 
appeared to be a lack of consensus between different professional groups as to how the 
referral criteria (in particular the contextual criterion) should be interpreted. This, in turn, 
resulted in a concern that some young people appearing before the youth court were being 
made subject to more onerous disposals than would have been applied by the adult 
summary court’ (Popham, et. al., 2005a: 60 emphasis added). In view of this point, the 
youth court is indicative of the contradictions inherent in much youth justice policy in 
the UK where potential offenders are diverted away from social justice and into criminal 
justice (cf. Muncie, 2004a). Indeed, while there was a view among some of the 
professionals that criteria were generally appropriate and were appropriately applied, 
some of the respondents who were interviewed for the evaluation 
–  principally  Sheriffs  and  social  workers  –  did  express  some  concern  that  the 
application of the contextual criterion was drawing in a few young people for first and 
relatively minor offences (such as breaches of the peace) (Popham et al, 2005a: 14). 
While  social  workers  and  Sheriffs  operate  at  the  opposite  ends  of  the  justice 
spectrum, the dissemination of discipline, we found, was continuous: the former seeks 
to allocate and administer the punishment, the latter exercises its ‘small powers’ in 
normalisation and expert knowledges to create a new kind of young, law-abiding and 
obedient young person (Hunt and Wickham, 2004: 20). From the outset, this has been 
the continuous disciplinary logic of the youth court: youth crime is multi-faceted and 
any response to it should be coordinated to address the citizenship of offenders as well 
as accountability for lawbreaking (Youth Court Feasibility Project Group, 2004: 24). 
From the perspectives of the young people we spoke to, the range of disciplinary 
measures were certainly viewed as far from benign. While many of the young people 
  
interviewed welcomed the additional support service provision, there was also some 
contradiction  in  the  responses  that  appeared  to  indicate  personal  intrusion  and 
‘controllization’ (Cohen, 1987: 363). The views of several young people included: 
 
I feel that they come into my life and tell me what tae dae. 
 
 
I don’t really like any of it. Coming to social work every 
time. 
(Female, age 17) 
 
 
(Male, age 16) 
 
It’s worse then the [Children’s] panel. Mair hard but easier than adult 
court. 
 
(Male, age 16) 
 
The Scottish youth court embodies ‘double bind’ justice (Muncie 2004b: 214) where young 
people in continual need of support become subject to fast-track punishment, intense 
supervision and increased regulation. The range of ‘interventions’ and ‘dedicated 
programmes’ at the disposal of the youth court (cognitive behaviour programmes, alcohol 
and drugs awareness; training activities; support for families – while largely not in place at 
the time of writing) are nevertheless testimony to how the parameters of correction 
become entwined with inclusion norms that are delivered by authorities of expertise. 
Consequently, the more task-oriented and less prohibitive forms of regulation that young 
people become subject to, circumvents legalistic problems that may incur if 
‘law’ is to dominate the youth court process. 
 
Understanding Modes of Justice in an Adult Court 
 
The young people interviewed were asked a series of questions that sought to ascertain 
their understandings of the purpose and process of the Youth Court. An established 
body of literature indicates that young people who offend are a particularly vulnerable 
group where socio-economic deprivation, family disruption or breakdown, alcohol and drug  
abuse,  low-self  esteem  and  poor  educational  attachment,  attendance  and 
attainment are higher than in the general population of young people (Muncie et al., 
2002). On the one hand, what was favoured about the youth court was the support and 
assistance from the appointed youth court social worker, and that it was perceived to be 
less punitive than the adult court: 
 
[My social worker has] helped me to get careers advice and she’s being coming and 
seeing us and has been helping me aye, which is really good. Gives a lot of 
information that I didn’t get before. Good aye. 
(Female, age 17) 
 
Well what I need, see like parent classes for me and my daughter see when she was 
born, I was alright you know, though see after a while, the post-natal depression . . . 
that’s how I went on to drugs and I’ve just went off my daughter. So that’s what I 
need. 
(Female, age 17) 
 
I feel good about the youth court order because if I was in an adult court, I would 
probably get more than what I did get at the youth court. 
  
On  the  other  hand,  young  people  appearing  before  the  court  identified  little 
engagement with those elements that seek to address need: 
 
I don’t know what the youth court is. 
 
 
I’m here because my charges were coming up in the 
big court. 
(Male, age 17) 
 
 
(Male, age 16) 
 
I heard they were trying to do-away-with the youth court, aye for 16/17 year olds 
and they were trying to put them in a real court room. 
(Male, age 17) 
 
Our view is that references to ‘the big court’ and ‘the real court room’ are revealing of an 
inability to meaningfully grasp the criminal trial. This was further highlighted by a 
distinctive observation of courtroom interactions including giggling and conversations 
between defendants and between defendants and acquaintances. Running parallel to the 
limitations of understanding, it was clear that some young offenders were coming to court to 
be punished and they expressed difficulties in comprehension of legal principles and 
practices (cf. Duff, 2002). Young offenders did not consider that an order imposed by the 
youth court would change their behaviour. Moreover, there was an acknowledgment that 
non-compliance revealed the lingering threat of more punitive measures: 
 
My charges would have been in the adult court, if the youth court wisnae here. 
Could still end up there though and I dinnane want that. 
 
 
 
They says I’m ready for the jail if I re-offend. 
 
 
I regret myself dain them things. I am bothered about going 
to jail. 
(Male, age 16) 
(Male, age 16) 
(Male, age 16) 
 
 
If I didn’t attend anything, I would breach my probation, breach my community 
service and just get put in jail. 
 
I’d have probably got the jail if I’d been in the adult 
court. 
 I got probation but the youth court is still a 
Punishment. 
(Male, age 16)  
(Male, age 17) 
 
(Male, age 16) 
  
Interestingly, while Sheriffs were of the view that developing rapport was not part of their 
remit, young offenders pointed out that there was greater dialogue between some Sheriffs 
and the defendants: 
 
The judge tells me praise. Not for anything bad just cos I’ve been sitting my test, 
attending all my meetings and community service. This made be feel quite good. 
Usually up getting punished, not praised. 
 
These comments illustrate how alongside the coercive enforcement of the youth court a 
benevolent function operates. The court can administer praise alongside punishment made 
possible by constant supervision. As a result, it was made clear to the young people that 
they are being punished for their own good and that they should be 
‘grateful’ for the extensive networks of supervision. The symbolism of the youth court as 
the ‘last chance’ before imprisonment is further evidence of its potential to criminalize 
young people. If this is so, then we must ask: is the youth court intimately bound up with 
justice for adults? 
Moreover, if the future focus of the young people is to fear further punishment then the 
youth court has clearly shifted from focusing on the needs to the deeds of those presented  
to  it.  The  shift  to  fear  further  punishment  accords  with  the  Scottish Executive funded 
evaluation findings that concluded that: 
 
Despite varying shrieval styles the messages given at reviews were similar. The threat 
of jail was commonly used either to emphasize that the community sentence imposed 
was the young person’s last chance and to  encourage (continuing) co-operation 
with the conditions of a community sentence: ‘Your liberty is likely to depend on 
you sticking to this probation order’. 
(Sheriff to young person) (Popham et al., 2005a: 39) 
 
In essence the Youth Court, we argue, sits awkwardly alongside rational and instrumental 
forms of adult justice with the effect of further criminalisation arising from the subversion 
of welfare and need (see Duff et al., 2004 for debates).4 
 
Spatial Dynamic and the Denial of ‘Context’ 
 
Article 40 of the UNCRC ensures that young people are treated with ‘dignity’ within 
criminal justice where their ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ are of paramount 
importance and where punishment should take into account the child’s age ‘or situation’. 
Judicial proceedings in the youth court do not subject young people to the full majesty of 
the law. We observed dialogue between young people and Sheriffs that was brief, one-
sided and unyielding. Consequently, we picked up dread fused with uncertainty on the part 
of the young people that was inextricably linked to a court ideology of dominance. This 
created a contradictory logic: a justice of individualized treatment aimed at normalization 
within an adult setting. There has been very little research into how young defendants 
experience court rooms (both operational and ideological dynamics), which is surprising 
given the increasing number of young people who are sentenced in adult courts and 
detained in prisons (Duff et al., 2004; Muncie, 2004b). 
We set out to observe the position and interaction of young people in the court room 
 setting. Carlen has noted: ‘the spacing and placing of people in public occasions is strategic 
to their ability to participate in them’ (Carlen, 1976: 21) and that the spacing of people, 
particularly in rituals where duties and rights are designated, will emphasize social status. 
In the youth court we observed that the traditional court-room ceremony remained intact 
with legal rhetoric monopolizing the proceedings. Defence Agents, Procurator Fiscals and 
the Sheriff were all robed (the Sheriff was also wigged) creating a boundary between 
judicial agents and the young defendant but also, emphasizing close proximity between 
judicial agents who operate a common organizational interest of the court room in a 
unique manner (getting cases away speedily; utilizing legal meanings and formal rules 
that are outside of common language usage, professionals acting in a state of almost 
perfect knowledge of the law, defendants engaging with the court when instructed and 
judicial representatives defining the reality of defendants). 
Furthermore, while it was evident from the observations of proceedings that there were 
varying degrees of familiarity with the adult court, we observed clear difficulties in how 
young people grasped legal meanings that could be translated into everyday language. 
Firstly, the physical distance between defendants and the judicial representatives made it 
difficult to hear what was actually happening, creating what has been referred to as ‘court 
deafness’ (see Carlen, 1976: 84; cf. Parker et al., 1981). Secondly, we observed Defence 
Agents moving backwards and forwards from the defendant’s bench to clarify discussions 
and repeat assertions made by the Sheriff or Procurator Fiscal. Thirdly, we observed a 
prevailing attitude towards the defendants that it was ‘necessary’ that they be spoken for 
and spoken to. None of the young people we observed were invited to provide input into 
the youth court proceedings. Fourthly; we did not observe a playing down of the formal 
constitutive rules. Rather, the sentencing of young people was linked to an adversarial 
notion of justice. There was no evidence of paternalism towards the young person and the 
young person was subordinated by court workers who would order the young person 
to stand and sit when ordered to, with little face-to-face contact. 
 
Our observation that the young defendants appeared to not fully understand or grasp 
questioning and court room proceedings requires further comment. We observed blank 
faces when asked to stand, to sit, to respond, to stay quiet or on the very rare occasion, to 
account or comment on their behaviour. The young person’s offensive or offending acts 
determined the parameters of justice and adversarial communication. The young person 
was seen and not heard. Court discourse was mobilized around proving guilt. 
 
A person’s inability to understand the court room process or the given sentence is 
common, but problematic (cf. Weijers and Duff, 2002). The young person is allocated a 
youth court social worker who is present in the court, but the social worker is to a degree 
silenced. Their presence, we observed, was to confirm any outlying questions on the 
background of the young offender rather than act as a defender of their rights. Of further 
note was the stereotyping of the judicial agents and court workers. To facilitate and 
manage the court room, the police officers would exert control over the families and 
friends who appeared in court to support defendants. This was part of frequently observed 
public chastisements whereby the defendant’s peers and kin were routinely neutralized 
and treated as ‘deviants’ or objectified in ways that labelled family and friends as 
troublesome and in need of social control (cf. Duff, 2002). 
 
 In July 2005 the Scottish Justice Minister identified a need for agencies dealing with 
youth offending to ‘raise their game’. She added: 
 
We now need improved results in some parts of the country to become universal 
delivery across the country – and hard-pressed communities need to see that 
quickly. 
(The Scottish Executive, 2005b) 
 
In terms of a ‘smarter performance’ the youth court is certainly meeting the objectives of 
fast-tracking cases and breach procedures. As mentioned earlier, guilty pleas mean  
that the number of trials and adjournments has been reduced. The youth court aspired to 
become a mode of justice designed to focus on the individual causes of offending; it is 
already being measured in terms of ‘what works’ and whether it conforms to 
predetermined government policies on youth crime where the time interval between 
arrest, charge and appearance at court is easily measured – areas that are prioritized 
over and above responding to the needs and circumstances of young people (Youth 
Court Feasibility Group  Report, 2002;  Scottish  Executive, 2005b). As  Pitts  (2001) 
states, the industry surrounding the ‘what works’ movement subverts science to 
governance and the rolling out of the youth court to Airdrie is further evidence of 
quantifying crime as de facto the measurement of successful criminal justice. We see this in 
the youth court because it relies on ‘facts’ for ‘service delivery’. In summation, the youth 
court process was professionalized and oppressive; it suppressed restoration and respectful  
conversation  (Weijers  and  Duff,  2002).  Given  its  adversarial  context  we question 
whether the youth court with its emphasis on intense, but short-term, support can address 
the emotional and psychological needs of young people referred to it (as outlined in Article 
37c of the UNCRC) (United Nations, 1989). It could also be argued that  some  defendants  
should  be  detained  for  their  own  protection  and  for  the protection of society. But to 
take a view that punishment and intervention are inextricably linked is the same as 
saying that access to services that promote welfare and rights becomes contingent on 
receiving a criminal conviction. This goes against international human rights norms that 
argue that arrest, prosecution and sentencing instead of leading to social justice create 
further social harm (see The Riyadh Rules, Article 5, f.). Linking structured supervision 
programmes to the sentence also stretches the spirit of Article 3 of the UNCRC which 
states that the best interests of the child or young person should be paramount at all 
times. The harmonious development of the child (Preamble, UNCRC our emphasis) is hence 
compromised. 
 
Scotland may be in the midst of a new penological epoch in how to deal with its young 
offenders. A punitive mood, absent for over 30 years, has been re-energized in Scottish 
youth justice and processes that engage, restore and rehabilitate young people have been, 
to a degree, silenced. We agree with Goldson (2002) that one of the most significant 
problems with the discipline model for youth justice is the punitive backdrop and all its 
complex ideological and procedural linkages, which include the adult court setting. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
McAra (2006:13) refers to the ‘de-tartanization’ of Scottish juvenile justice. The 
development of the youth court represents a further example of the punitive reach of 
 Westminster’s youth justice agenda that continues to compromise ‘a distinctive Scottish 
identity’ in dealing with young offenders. However it might be suggested that as the 
youth court is diverting 16 and 17 year olds away from the adult system it should be a 
welcomed development. There are two points to consider. First, 16 and 17 year old 
offenders under the supervision of the Children’s Hearing would almost always have 
had  their  case  remitted  back  to  the  Hearing  unless  they  had  committed  serious 
indictable offences. Indeed at Hamilton, there were a slightly higher proportion of cases at 
the youth court, in comparison to the Sheriff Summary Court, being admonished or 
  remitted back to the Children’s Hearing System (Popham et al., 2005a).  
 
But at the same  time, in comparison to the Sheriff Summary Court, the youth court made 
‘greater use of detention and community-based disposals and much less use of fines’ 
(Popham et al., 2005a: 46). This contradiction raises a key concern about the youth 
court’s role in up-tariffing. Second, the youth court is simply an adult court setting 
masquerading as a fast-track youth process. In that sense, diversion is not achieved and 
Scotland remains one of the few countries in Europe that prosecutes its children in adult 
‘contexts’. The youth court sees ‘persistent’ 16 and 17 year old offenders pleading guilty 
more often than if they were appearing in the Sheriff Summary Court and receiving 
greater rates of detention. 
 
It  is  clear  that  recent  changes  in  youth  justice  in  the  UK  have  created  new 
conceptions of youth as troubling and troublesome. The Youth Court serves as a 
‘punitive backdrop’ to these changes. But the youth court carries a deeper message, 
rooted in what has been called the crisis of civil society’s relationship to young people 
in  Scotland:  the  reported  inadequacies  of  the  Children’s  Hearing  System,  the 
politicization  of  youth  crime,  the  shift  in  focus  from  child-centred  responses  to 
concerns of neighbourhoods and victims, the potential for greater court involvement 
in the hearings process as a result of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 and elements of 
the Anti-social Behaviour Act. What kind of response to the crisis is emerging? In 
relation to young people, a new set of procedures has emerged that attaches itself to adult 
modes of justice and discourses such that mediation and restoration are subverted and 
to a degree silenced in favour of fast-tracking, guilty-pleas and intense monitoring. 
 
The youth court is seen by many offenders and facilitators as punitive. But the 
emphasis on fast-tracking, new and promised extended programmes to be delivered by 
multi-disciplinary teams, speedy justice, and moral and legal blame within an adult 
context, suggests that Scotland’s youth court is what Christie (1994) and Scraton and 
Hayden (2002) describe as an exemplary punishment: non-lenient and non-ambiguous. 
The young people we spoke to feared further punishment which suggests that there is 
nothing  to  ‘trade’  punishment  with  by  way  of  a  reparative  approach  based  on 
negotiation,  mediation  or  arbitration.  The  youth  court,  therefore,  renders  social 
mitigation redundant. In place of inclusion is exclusion; and punishment and guilt are 
displayed as the icons of success. Moreover, by taking into account factors other than 
the welfare of the young person; the compelling nature of admitting to prior offending 
before entering a plea demonstrates serious incompatibilities between the youth court 
and UN instruments referred to above. 
  
It is  likely  that the  youth  court model will  be rolled  out  nationally throughout 
Scotland. Given the failure to provide adequate resourcing for the two pilot courts, it 
is likely that ‘distinctiveness’ will be compromised. It is further likely that welfare-based 
programmes will be jettisoned in favour of politically palatable outcomes, namely, ‘guilty 
pleas, ‘fast-tracked justice’, cost-effectiveness and administrative efficiency. Clearly the 
Children’s  Hearing  System  is  under  threat  and  Scotland’s  lowest  age  of  criminal 
responsibility in Europe (eight years) may see younger, emotionally immature offenders 
appearing before the youth court than is currently the case. For now, our research 
indicates that the youth court exacerbates a further state of powerlessness in young 
defendants  who  are  denied  the  multifaceted  approaches  required  to  address  the 
deprivations and social exclusions that are intricately related to their offending. Of course, 
advocates of the youth court will dismiss our concerns as mere ‘teething problems’. 
However, we would argue that violations of children’s rights, due process, increased use of 
detention and net widening are not administrative hiccups but the beginnings of a seriously 
flawed process premised on actuarial justice. As a result, our concerns are at a much 
deeper level than procedural efficiency. The youth court in Scotland represents what 
Muncie (2005: 40) refers to as ‘an acceleration of the governance of  young  people  
through  crime  and  disorder’.  This  is  part  of  an Anglo-American trend where neo-
liberal youth crime policies are transferred and interpreted for local contexts. As Muncie 
(2005: 57) argues, ‘in every country and every locality, youth justice appears to be ‘‘made 
up’’ through unstable and constantly shifting alliances between neo-liberal, conservative 
and social democratic mentalities’. The youth court in Scotland is a ‘made up mixture’ of 
competing ideologies but one that emphasizes responsibility, individual choice and limited 
tolerance. In that sense it represents what Smith (2005: 182) identifies as a contemporary 
state of uncertainty within juvenile justice systems across liberal democracies, notably, 
‘whether to treat young offenders as children requiring help and guidance or as 
morally responsible agents who deserve to be punished’. We agree with this assessment 
but add that youth justice policies are also about political priorities that transcend debates 
about ‘best practice’ or notions of ‘what works’. 
 
The Juvenile Court model in Scotland was abandoned more than three decades ago in 
favour of a needs-centred process that would more appropriately deal with the 
complexities of youth crime. Yet it has re-emerged within a more punitive guise and its 
anticipated national roll-out will, on the basis of current evidence, continue to lead to an 
increase in juvenile custody while drawing less serious young offenders into an adult 
system of justice. 
 
Notes 
 
1 It should be noted that all 15 year-old offenders in Scotland (unless charged with a 
serious offence) appear before the Children’s Hearing System (see Lord Advocate’s 
Guidelines and section 42 Criminal Procedure [Scotland] Act 1995). On the other hand, 16 
and 17 year old offenders in Scotland are referred directly to the adult Sheriff Court except if 
they are under the supervision of the Children’s Hearing System. In such cases matters are 
remitted back to the Children’s Hearing unless the Procurator Fiscal or a Sheriff determine 
 the charges to be too serious for a Children’s Hearing (see sections 42, 48 and 49 of the 
Criminal Procedure [Scotland] Act 1995). 
 
2   The authors were members of the evaluation team commissioned by the Scottish  
Executive. The argument in this article is drawn from fieldwork conducted by the authors 
during the evaluation. The views contained in this article are, therefore, not those of the 
evaluation team but of the individual authors. 
 
3   Burberry is an internationally renowned fashion house founded in 1856. More recently, 
it has become an item of choice for working class young people in Britain. In our observation, 
the overwhelming majority of offenders appearing before the youth court were wearing 
clothing in the famous Burberry design. The title of this article is derived from a defence 
solicitor who stated with a mixture of disdain and humour ‘welcome to the Burberry Court’. 
 
4 The Justice 2 Committee in 2004 commissioned a Youth Justice Inquiry. The remit 
of the Inquiry was twofold: to review the effectiveness of multi-agency working in the 
youth justice field and to identify and assess the impact of gaps in service provision. 
Evidence from a pre-inquiry seminar held in March 2004 raised many issues. There was 
universal agreement that youth offending in Scotland is inextricably linked to multiple 
deprivations and requires a holistic response at the forefront of which are the needs of the 
offender (see Scottish Parliament, 2004). 
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